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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1952-53 TERM
with foreign countries, and as such it must fall as unconstitu-
tional.22 But it has been held that each state possesses the power
to control the manner in which property within its own jurisdic-
tion passes by last will and testament.? Along with this power the
state may direct how both the procedure for the probate of the will
and the process of administration is effectuated.24  Actually the
executive freezing order could be terminated without altering the
conditions for which § 269 was enacted; for there would still be no
guarantee that the distributee would receive the bequest and this
uncertainty would frustrate New York's attempt to safe guard the
testatrix's desires to protect the legatee's property. 5  Further-
more, the court overlooked the possibility of Executive Order No.
8389 which provides that such funds may be in the alternative
deposited "in a blocked account or with a public officer, agency, or
instrumentality designated by a court having jurisdiction of the
estate."126 This could have well been- interpreted as giving the
state courts the express power to direct where the money should
be deposited. Thus the question of constitutionality might have
been avoided.
Settlement For After-born. Children
The Court of Appeals has finally in a 5 to 2 opinion settled the
question of what constitutes a settlement for an after-born child
not provided for in the last will and testament of his parent. The
holding of In re Faber's Estate7 was that a settlement is de-
pendent upon the intent of the testator and the facts of the indi-
vidual case. In the instant case the testator left a net estate of
$54,000 in trust for his wife and father with a weekly amount to
be paid to both of them, and in the case that the wife's weekly
amount was not sufficient, then additional amounts of any size
were to be made from the principal. The principal was to go to
the older child upon the death of the testator's father's and wife's
deaths. The only other child, after-born, was the co-beneficiary,
with her sister, of insurance policies which amounted to $14,500
for each child. The executors brought an action to determine if
the amount of insurance policies constituted a settlement for the
after-born child. The court found that they did constitute a set-
tlement.
22. U. S. CoNsr. Art. I, § 8.
23. Mager v. Grima, 8 How. 490 (U. S. 1850) ; see also Rocca v. Thompson, 223
U. S. 317 (1912).
24. Lyeth v. Hoey. 305 U. S. 188 (1938).
25. Matter of Wcidberg, 172 Misc. 524, 15 N. Y. S. 2d 252 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
26. See note 18 supra [italics added].
27. 305 N. Y. 200, 11I N. E. 2d 883 (1953).
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In New York it has been held that parenthood in itself con-
stituted a revocation of any existing will in so far as the after-
born child is concerned, - following the English rule that even
the intent of the testator that his will should not be revoked is
insufficient to override the presumed revocation.2 9 However,
other New York courts have decided cases in accordance with
and in opposition to the English rule.30 By the instant case
the law of New York is held to be contra to the English doctrine.
Although the gift given in settlement must be absolute, it
can be made contingent on the testator's life.31 It is also required
that the settlement be in written form.2 Thus an insurance policy
on the life of the testator can be a proper settlement.
The court reasons in the present case that if they were to
award the after-born child her intestate share, then there would
be a disappropriate division of the estate. The after-born child
would receive a total of $32,000 while her sister would only receive
$14,500 with only an expectancy of receiving the corpus of the
trust which the court' said would practically be naught, in the
light of the unlhnited power given to the trustee to give to the
testator's wife any amount that she -might need above her weekly
payments. The money payable out of the insurance policies was
then held to constitute a settlement and would provide for the
child's education: and maintenance in the future in the same man-
ner as a child who would have been born at the time of the making
of the will.
While the majority opinion appears to be equitable in its
results, it does not set up a clear standard for future litigation.
Judge Desmond in his dissent attempts to set up a standard that
could be excellent if applied in moderation. The three principles
that he sets up are: first, that a gift or transfer to constitute a
settlement should be made in writing; second, that it should be
absolute and not contingent; and third, that there be weighty evi-
28. Matter of Del Genovese's Will, 169 App. Div. 140, 154 N. Y. Supp. 806 (2d
Dep't 1915).
29. Marston v. Roe and Roe v., Marston, 112 Eng. Rep. 742 (1838), "And we
all concur in the opinion that the revocation of a will takes place in consequence of a
rule or principle of law, independently altogether of any question of intention of the
party (testator) himself, and consequently that no such evidence (as to his intent) is
admissible".
30. In re Kennedy's Will, 167 N. Y. 163, 60 N. E. 442 (1901); In re Stern'sEstate, 189 Misc. 639, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 631 (Surr. Ct. 1945). Contra: Matter of Stone'sWill, 200 Misc. 639, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 775 (Surr. Ct. 1951) ; Matter of Froeb's Estate,
143 Misc. 660, 257 N. Y. Supp. 851 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
31. Matter of Backer's [Vill, 148 Misc. 318, 266 N. Y. Supp. 47 (Surr. Ct. 1933);
Matter of Froeb's Estate, supra note 34; Matter of Kirk's Estate, 191 Misc. 473, 80
N. Y. S. 2d 378 (Surr. Ct. 1948).
32. Matter of Snopek's Estate, 249 App. Div. 369, 292 N. Y. Supp. 359, aff'd, 275
N. Y. 606, 11 N. E. 2d 778 (1937).
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dence, inside or outside the writing, that it is intended to be a
settlement by which his child would be provided for after his
death. The first two requirements are concurred in by the ma-
jority. It was only -with his third requirement that they differed.
Judge Desmond's application was too strict and in cases such as
the instant one the results would prove inequitable. His term
"weighty evidence" should include the surrounding circumstances
so that testator's intent may be shown by the relationship of the
amount of his estate and the amount given to each legatee under
the will. Only in this manner will it be possible to avoid the injus-
tice of providing the after-born child with a sum out of proportion
to that received by the other children living at the time of the
execution of the will. This inequitable result surely would not be
the intent of a testator.
Substitution of Executor for Testator
In Humbeutet v. HumbeuteZ,3 the testator, who had been the
plaintiff in the action, had recovered a judgment from her son di-
recting him to pay over to her certain amounts of cash and securi-
ties in his possession. After the testator's death, her executor
moved to amend the final judgment requiring the son to deliver
the cash and securities to the executor. The nunc pro tunc amend-
ment made to substitute the executor for the testator was held
valid by the Court of Appeals.
There should be no reason, in the light that the executor is
the continuing personality of the testator 34 and that a judgment
may be amended to conform to the actual state of facts,35 that a
court should not be justified in allowing the amendment nunc pro
tunc so that the executor can settle the estate of the deceased in
the most expedient manner possible. There would be little reason
in holding that the executor must establish his right to possession
of the property when the right of the deceased has been already
established and he is that person in the eyes of the law.
33. 305 N. Y. 159. lII N. E. 2d 429 (1953).
34. C. P. A. § 84, "In the case of the death of a sole plaintiff or a sole defendant,
if the cause of action survives or continues, the court, upon a motion, must allow or
compel the action to be continued by or against his representative or successor in inter-
est"; see also § 557 (3), "Where the adverse party has died since the making of the
order or the rendering of the judgment appealed from or where the judgment appealed
from was rendered after his death, in a case prescribed by law, an appeal may be taken
as if he were living, but it cannot be heard until the heir, devisee, executor or adminis-
trator, as the case requires, has been substituted."
35. Herpe v. Herpe, 225 N. Y. 323, 122 N. E. 204 (1919); followed in Core v.
Hoffman, 256 N. Y. 254, 176 N. E. 383 (1931) ; see also, C. P. A. § 105.
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